tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2475517391193604568.post3852628113004841221..comments2023-04-30T08:12:10.026-07:00Comments on Commonplaces and Comments: Trying to formalize the OTFJesse Parrishhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07811498368484905340noreply@blogger.comBlogger29125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2475517391193604568.post-28771702352707179892011-08-18T12:35:16.007-07:002011-08-18T12:35:16.007-07:00[Continued]
"Because I think the OTF is not ...[Continued]<br /><br />"Because I think the OTF is not an argument, per se, but a criticism. So, if religious belief is to be considered more reasonable than, say solipsism, what are the (non-question begging) standards that we apply to distinguish the bogus religious claims from the true? This, it seems, should be the answer to the OTF."<br /><br />The OTF is a strange criticism, as it lacks any conclusion. It might be used to invite critical reflection on belief, but again, the OTF adds nothing to the other methods of making the invitation.<br /><br />I think that (roughly) the answer you are seeking is available. But it requires a lot of hard work, and the method is generally unavailable to popular audiences without a lot of individual exertion. But that is the price of air-tight argumentation; there are lots of holes to plug.Jesse Parrishhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07811498368484905340noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2475517391193604568.post-50538317458999283042011-08-18T12:35:04.655-07:002011-08-18T12:35:04.655-07:00Tony,
First, I apologize for the delayed response...Tony,<br /><br />First, I apologize for the delayed response.<br /><br />"First, a quick clarification: By the epistemic merit/degree of historical standards, do you mean the extent to which historical accounts should be valued, or that the standards should help to meaningfully distinguish between competing historical claims? (I agree that both should be considered, but I want to make sure that you don’t mean something else.)"<br /><br />It is a mixture of the two. I discuss part of the first argument in a reformulation of Hume's argument. I suspect, however, that overly general statements which limit the epistemic strength of historical findings, as represented by a Bayes factor, will fail. So, in my reworking, the first step of analyzing an argument for a miracle via historical documents is to investigate ineliminable sources of error and determining what constraints these impose on any argument proceeding from the relevant texts. If no convincing procedure of this type is found, one extracts more details concerning the texts, logging the cumulative potential of error as one proceeds. Now, concerning the latter statement, distinctions between competing explanations will have to be taken in the particulars of a particular analysis. So, for example, if one is discussing the textual evidence for the Resurrection, contrasting it with `something else', one teases out the `most important' hypotheses in the category `something else'. From there, values are investigated. (An example of this procedure is found in the McGrews' paper on the Resurrection and my discussion of the same.)<br /><br />We should not invest in overly general standards. I do not think it necessary to do so, and I do not think that such proposals will be overly convincing.<br /><br />"That question aside, the point I was trying to make is that the OTF raises the issue (however inelegantly promoted by some) that it seems impossible to meaningfully distinguish between all of the competing (and contradictory) religious claims when viewed by an outsider."<br /><br />There are two senses in which this statement can be read: the first is that many religions cannot all be epistemically accounted for due to their overwhelming number and possible number. This is a truism. The second sense is that the `type' of evidence presented for a variety of competing religions is similar in some epistemically significant way. This too is correct; but as against proponents of the OTF, the effect of this similarity may be analyzed in terms of Bayes factors as opposed to demands about prior distributions.<br /><br />"Notice that I am not saying that the religious believer need convince the outsider that her religious belief is true. What I am saying is that given the differences in competing claims among all religions, the outsider seems to be lacking a well-defined epistemic standard that he can apply to make a reasonable determination about which religious belief is most likely true. This, it seems to me, introduces the need for a universal set of standards that can be applied to religious claims. And this should be the goal of any religious believer who feels that that their religious belief warrants getting this answer right."<br /><br />Before attempt to investigate a `universal' set of standards for religious claims, we can instead apply the preexisting, general rules of inference available in Bayesian philosophy. Where valid, a universal standard should `fall out' of this general theory. Since these methods are applied in the sciences and everyday life with such success, their extension to religious claims is of tremendous interest - to apologists and atheists alike.Jesse Parrishhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07811498368484905340noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2475517391193604568.post-87050401514656662862011-08-18T09:12:00.024-07:002011-08-18T09:12:00.024-07:00Ah, was it though?
When I was criticizing an `ath...Ah, was it though?<br /><br />When I was criticizing an `atheist' argument, you were happy to laud my reasonableness. However, the very moment I said anything remotely critical about the relationship between science and religion - as exampled by Galileo - you decided to renounce your previous opinion. Despite your not having carefully read my position. Despite the concurrence of religious people with the reasonableness of my very qualified position.<br /><br />So yes, I know you've changed your initial opinion already. Ever since I defended anything even remotely challenging to your position, your mind flipped like a soggy pancake.<br /><br />As I said before, I'm happy to work without your approval. If you really think that my usage of female pronouns for non-descript, imaginary people is a crime against rationality, I am <i>more</i> than happy to work without your approval.Jesse Parrishhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07811498368484905340noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2475517391193604568.post-88529453945401803912011-08-18T02:36:59.130-07:002011-08-18T02:36:59.130-07:00I see, Mr Parrish, that my initial impression of y...I see, Mr Parrish, that my initial impression of you, fostered by Mr Reppert, was quite mistaken.Ilíonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15339406092961816142noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2475517391193604568.post-16496056785146392432011-08-17T18:56:25.256-07:002011-08-17T18:56:25.256-07:00Do you spend a lot of time talking to squirrels?Do you spend a lot of time talking to squirrels?Jesse Parrishhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07811498368484905340noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2475517391193604568.post-68612902124275026962011-08-17T18:56:07.072-07:002011-08-17T18:56:07.072-07:00You're a very lonely person, aren't you, I...You're a very lonely person, aren't you, Ilion?Jesse Parrishhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07811498368484905340noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2475517391193604568.post-23244995126053792782011-08-17T18:35:23.870-07:002011-08-17T18:35:23.870-07:00"Notice that I am not saying that the religio..."<i>Notice that I am not saying that the religious believer need convince the outsider that <b>her</b> religious belief ...</i>"<br /><br />On top of all the other foolish and/or bad-reasoned things you go about saying, you also must use that false and disgusting "gender inclusive language"?Ilíonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15339406092961816142noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2475517391193604568.post-76278874007673722262011-08-17T17:40:25.420-07:002011-08-17T17:40:25.420-07:00JP, sorry, been very busy at work. I wanted to fol...JP, sorry, been very busy at work. I wanted to follow up on the discussion, so here are my (still too hastily prepared) thoughts.<br /><br />JP: “As you've said, it could use some clean-up. Let me know if you have success and we'll discuss it. In particular, the standards you list need to be clearly translated in terms of epistemic merit/degree. Some historical accounts of miracles are more sound - or less obviously bunkum - than others.”<br /><br />Yeah, not sure entirely we’re I was going with this, but let me try and push it forward. First, a quick clarification: By the epistemic merit/degree of historical standards, do you mean the extent to which historical accounts should be valued, or that the standards should help to meaningfully distinguish between competing historical claims? (I agree that both should be considered, but I want to make sure that you don’t mean something else.)<br /><br />That question aside, the point I was trying to make is that the OTF raises the issue (however inelegantly promoted by some) that it seems impossible to meaningfully distinguish between all of the competing (and contradictory) religious claims when viewed by an outsider. This should give any religious believer pause, because if they cannot persuade an outsider that their religious claim can be meaningfully distinguished from other religious claims, I think this jeopardizes the reasonableness of that individual’s religious belief.<br /><br />Notice that I am not saying that the religious believer need convince the outsider that her religious belief is true. What I am saying is that given the differences in competing claims among all religions, the outsider seems to be lacking a well-defined epistemic standard that he can apply to make a reasonable determination about which religious belief is most likely true. This, it seems to me, introduces the need for a universal set of standards that can be applied to religious claims. And this should be the goal of any religious believer who feels that that their religious belief warrants getting this answer right.<br /><br />What I am suggesting is that to criticize the OTF, one should be able to offer a solution to the problems it highlights (described above). Because I think the OTF is not an argument, per se, but a criticism. So, if religious belief is to be considered more reasonable than, say solipsism, what are the (non-question begging) standards that we apply to distinguish the bogus religious claims from the true? This, it seems, should be the answer to the OTF.Tony Hoffmanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14178419155873935555noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2475517391193604568.post-49876936304788865922011-08-11T18:21:03.987-07:002011-08-11T18:21:03.987-07:00I'll take your points out of order, if you'...I'll take your points out of order, if you'll forgive that.<br /><br />"But I very comfortable with moral issues being dependent on time and place, as I am sympathetic to moral subjectivism. So I see no problem with special pleading there."<br /><br /><a href="http://commonplacesandcomments.blogspot.com/2011/07/secular-morality-and-metaphysics.html" rel="nofollow">Agreed</a>.<br /><br />"In other words, it seems to me that the OTF’s purpose is not to serve as an argument against all religious belief, but to ask the religious believer to find grounds for her belief. So, my question back to you (and Thrasymachus), is why can’t the OTF merely be a very good question with which to start? (or, Whence the anger over Loftus’s promotion of the OTF?)"<br /><br />Were that only it, I would not have a problem. As I explained in my earlier post, what I objected to is the gross over-inflation of a perfectly legitimate point. If Loftus can say something like "reasonable/intellectually consistent Christians should take the OTF, and if they fail it, they should not believe", he isn't exactly suggesting a starting point of discussion or empathy.<br /><br />"The OTF, it seems to me, seeks to highlight the fact that there are no objective criteria with which a faith-based (or poorly documented) claim can be meaningfully differentiated against another. And I imagine that raising awareness of this fact is what the OTF does most effectively. And if so, I think it does serve a useful purpose (while not functioning as advertised by some, I imagine), and is hardly a thing to be abandoned."<br /><br />As I've been discussing <a href="http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=10584495&postID=1961574663034631740&page=1&token=1313030611889" rel="nofollow">over here</a>, another big problem with the posited `Outsider position' is one of non-uniqueness. Christians - or at least those serious about rational warrant - tend to work scientific inquiry into their outlook. I'm not sure what tools we have that they lack which we can assert as being such, categorically, before entering the arguments.Jesse Parrishhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07811498368484905340noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2475517391193604568.post-35175477266643418012011-08-11T17:54:51.679-07:002011-08-11T17:54:51.679-07:00Okay, I think I'm catching up a little bit her...Okay, I think I'm catching up a little bit here at your and Thrasymachus's objections (I just now skimmed through his entry for the first time). <br /><br />One that that it seems that neither of your comments address (and excuse me if they do but I haven't read them yet, or maybe I just missed them) is that the OTF serves to highlight the fact that there are no objective measures with which to compare the credibility of religious beliefs. <br /><br />Thrasymachus brings up that evolution could, by the OTF, be seen as highly unlikely. But this seems to ignore the fact that there are excellent objective criteria available with which to resolve disagreement about Evolution with other explanations for the diversity of life. There are not excellent objective criteria available with which to resolve disagreement about religious claims. I don’t think I agree that it is special pleading to point this out. <br /><br />The non-existence of God is trickier, because the existence of a God is a moving target. <br /><br />But I very comfortable with moral issues being dependent on time and place, as I am sympathetic to moral subjectivism. So I see no problem with special pleading there. <br /><br />The OTF, it seems to me, seeks to highlight the fact that there are no objective criteria with which a faith-based (or poorly documented) claim can be meaningfully differentiated against another. And I imagine that raising awareness of this fact is what the OTF does most effectively. And if so, I think it does serve a useful purpose (while not functioning as advertised by some, I imagine), and is hardly a thing to be abandoned.<br /><br />In other words, it seems to me that the OTF’s purpose is not to serve as an argument against all religious belief, but to ask the religious believer to find grounds for her belief. So, my question back to you (and Thrasymachus), is why can’t the OTF merely be a very good question with which to start? (or, Whence the anger over Loftus’s promotion of the OTF?)Tony Hoffmanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14178419155873935555noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2475517391193604568.post-78390441098742512742011-08-11T00:09:34.309-07:002011-08-11T00:09:34.309-07:00"See? It's not so difficult."
You m..."See? It's not so difficult."<br /><br />You might have noticed that tautologies receive probability 1 in Bayesianism. If I wanted to be pesky, I could reduce each of your three examples to problems of semantic model-dependency and translation from (possibly unreal) abstraction to something of ontological status - introducing potential errors in the process - but I'll leave that aside.<br /><br />The question I asked was concerning religion. Do you think that absolute certainty is ever warranted concerning possibly false propositions as entertained by fallible reasoners?Jesse Parrishhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07811498368484905340noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2475517391193604568.post-12411103103076093872011-08-10T23:55:33.619-07:002011-08-10T23:55:33.619-07:00"... But no, I do not take assertions of abso..."<i>... But no, I do not take assertions of absolute certainty to be reasonable.<br /><br />Would you care to try?</i>"<br /><br />Example 1: I am absolutely certain that 1+1=2 in all times and all places; further, I assert as an absolute certaintly that any man who denies this is either stupid or a fool (that is, intellectually dishonest), with whom conversation on any subject is logically impossible.<br /><br />Example 2: I am absolutely certain that the law of non-contradiction is true, valid, and applicable in all times and all places; further, I assert as an absolute certaintly that any man who denies this is either stupid or a fool (that is, intellectually dishonest), with whom conversation on any subject is logically impossible.<br /><br />Example 3: I am absolutely certain that what is true is true and what is false is false, and that the one never "becomes" the other, and that the assertion of this certainty is true, valid, and applicable in all times and all places; further, I assert as an absolute certaintly that any man who denies this is either stupid or a fool (that is, intellectually dishonest), with whom conversation on any subject is logically impossible.<br /><br />See? It's not so difficult.Ilíonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15339406092961816142noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2475517391193604568.post-8707538754353604132011-08-10T23:46:56.282-07:002011-08-10T23:46:56.282-07:00"If one is not certain that the beliefs one c..."If one is not certain that the beliefs one chooses to hold and promote are true, then does that not make one, at best, a liar, and quite possibly intellectually dishonest (which is worse than mere lying)?"<br /><br />I'm not certain about gravity. I am extremely confident about gravity. I assign it a very high probability. Am I lying to say that gravity exists, and that it is inadvisable to waltz off a skyscraper?<br /><br />You'll note that I didn't beg the question against religious belief, even quite strong religious belief. If absolute certainty is to be contended with, we must look somewhere other than probabilistic argument. But no, I do not take assertions of absolute certainty to be reasonable.<br /><br />Would you care to try?Jesse Parrishhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07811498368484905340noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2475517391193604568.post-82998466506575633532011-08-10T23:38:41.518-07:002011-08-10T23:38:41.518-07:00"First, let me clear some fumes: I am assumin..."<i>First, let me clear some fumes: I am assuming that everyone involved agrees that </i>certainty<i> in religious beliefs is unwarranted.</i>"<br /><br />Why would you, or anyone, assume this? Is this not begging the question against "religion"? Does not this assumption undercut your pose as being an open-minded searcher for the truth?<br /><br />If one is not <i>certain</i> that the beliefs one chooses to hold and promote are true, then does that not make one, at best, a liar, and quite possibly intellectually dishonest (which is worse than mere lying)?Ilíonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15339406092961816142noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2475517391193604568.post-71643540862734160302011-08-10T10:54:13.846-07:002011-08-10T10:54:13.846-07:00"I'm still absorbing some of these posts...."I'm still absorbing some of these posts. A principal point of confusion for me is your saying, " the argument Loftus presents cannot be probabilized." I think you also say that the argument is only trivially empirical (Div and Dep). I guess that I'm not understanding how it is that the numbers proposed in the OTF cannot be probablized (and I assume that this means that I don't understand the definition for 'probabalized)."<br /><br />What I have done in this post is to categorize what the OTF <i>could be</i> into three forms: a deductive argument, a probabilistic argument, or a (strange form of) objective Bayesian demands about prior distributions.<br /><br />If it was merely the third form, then the inapplicability of the OTF to Calvinism makes no sense. But the probabilistic version - where the inapplicability of the OTF to Calvinism does make sense - does not translate into a valid argument about the probability of (some forms of) Christianity. There are two crucial terms to be discussed, i.e. the prior odds and the Bayes factor, which are required to yield that conclusion.<br /><br />Loftus assumes at the outset that the prior odds are low, which begs the question that Christian belief is unwarranted, and that a secular alternative must have the lion's share of probability when entering into other arguments.<br /><br />So when I say `trivially empirical', I mean that the first two premises of the OTF are empirical, but the inference to any particular improbability is <i>not</i> empirical.Jesse Parrishhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07811498368484905340noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2475517391193604568.post-17312481333977556832011-08-10T09:42:03.117-07:002011-08-10T09:42:03.117-07:00Nevermind. Just realized I had a problem with my o...Nevermind. Just realized I had a problem with my online accounts. Ignore the double posting (non)issue.Tony Hoffmanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17445688550795779770noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2475517391193604568.post-64753301095227449262011-08-10T09:39:06.714-07:002011-08-10T09:39:06.714-07:00Interesting how your last comment to me, and mine ...Interesting how your last comment to me, and mine just now, arrive in my e-mail box as double posts. I will respond again if this comment double posts in my e-mail box -- maybe you can fix that with a setting?Tony Hoffmanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17445688550795779770noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2475517391193604568.post-44372922386605720652011-08-10T09:37:21.742-07:002011-08-10T09:37:21.742-07:00I'm still absorbing some of these posts. A pri...I'm still absorbing some of these posts. A principal point of confusion for me is your saying, " the argument Loftus presents cannot be probabilized." I think you also say that the argument is only trivially empirical (Div and Dep). I guess that I'm not understanding how it is that the numbers proposed in the OTF cannot be probablized (and I assume that this means that I don't understand the definition for 'probabalized).Tony Hoffmanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17445688550795779770noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2475517391193604568.post-85652862502403164462011-08-09T14:48:17.959-07:002011-08-09T14:48:17.959-07:00Before saying too much, I'll wait on you as re...Before saying too much, I'll wait on you as requested.<br /><br />"Right, I think we are in agreement here."<br /><br />Which as I explained in the post means that the OTF is neither deductive nor probabilistic. Properly speaking, it isn't even empirical, except in the trivial sense that Div and Dep happen to be empirical.<br /><br />Anyways, the approach I gave as an alternative example has its limitations. I stipulate (1), but many Christians might disagree, though there may be arguments internal to Christianity for its truth (e.g. those of C.S. Lewis and other conservative apologists.) It's also incomplete. If the evidence for the Resurrection leaves it at probability 1/1000, there may be other arguments for Christianity using Bayes theorem, just as there will be arguments against it. So in order to ensure (4), we have to modify (3) as follows:<br /><br />(3)': the cumulative evidence for Christianity does not overcome its prior improbability as yielded by (2).Jesse Parrishhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07811498368484905340noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2475517391193604568.post-91202499475815196112011-08-09T09:08:35.972-07:002011-08-09T09:08:35.972-07:00JP: " If a rational person has a belief, and ...JP: " If a rational person has a belief, and encounters a fact which does not affect the probability of that belief, that person is being reasonable with respect to that fact."<br /><br />Well, there is being reasonable with respect to one's belief, and there is having a reasonable belief. If the above is your standard, isn’t my belief that I'm a brain in a vat reasonable? It just seems to me that in order to seek shelter from the OTF one needs to adopt an empistemically-sealed environment, and that hardly seems like a reasonable position.<br /><br />JP: "I'm not claiming that Calvinism is reasonable here, just that an OTF-like attempt to demonstrate the unreasonability of Calvinism does not work."<br /><br />Right, I think we are in agreement here. <br /><br />JP: "Now, how should we assess prior odds for Christianity?"<br /><br />Yeah, that is the live question. I am interested to see what you come up with.<br /><br />I see now that I should catch up to this conversation by reading your August 5 post. Let me do that first and resume there or here.Tony Hoffmanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14178419155873935555noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2475517391193604568.post-4605802602914041542011-08-08T19:39:23.897-07:002011-08-08T19:39:23.897-07:00My thanks for your reply. And no worries, I don&#...My thanks for your reply. And no worries, I don't think you're being daft at all.<br /><br />"I just don’t understand this, nor how it applies to my question."<br /><br />I was basically pointing to the odds form of Bayes rule as an alternative approach. I should have been clearer in saying that this doesn't mean that <i>nobody should</i> adopt such odds, only that the OTF, which is an epistemically aggressive statement, does not successfully establish that somebody should.<br /><br />"Well, my point is that it appears that you are defending the reasonableness of a Calvinist who “knows” that he is saved, precisely because his faith says that he is among the few. I find it hard to call a tautological position reasonable."<br /><br />If a rational person has a belief, and encounters a fact which does not affect the probability of that belief, that person is being reasonable with respect to that fact.<br /><br />I'm not claiming that Calvinism is reasonable here, just that an OTF-like attempt to demonstrate the unreasonability of Calvinism does not work.<br /><br />On methods to assess priors: as I mentioned before, a commonly employed method is equivocation, but equivocation is what one does on the assumption that no relevant information is available.<br /><br />Now, how should we assess prior odds for Christianity? I think we have to spell out what Christianity means in order to do so. I have some ideas. To repeat a comment from over at the <i>dangerous idea</i> thread:<br /><br />""<br />An example:<br /><br />1. Christianity is true only if the Resurrection occurred.<br />2. The prior probability of the Resurrection is calibrated with respect to our confidence in the tendency of dead people to remain dead.<br />3. The textual evidence for the Resurrection is not sufficiently strong to overcome the prior yielded in (2).<br />4. Therefore, Christianity is probably not true.<br /><br />I'm working on <a href="http://commonplacesandcomments.blogspot.com/2011/08/unconfirmability-argument.html" rel="nofollow">such a method</a> to craft a somewhat general, Humean argument against miracles, but it relies on certain qualifiers and conditions which may be reasonable to reject. Someone may claim that (2) fails to hold if they have an adequate natural theology, independently defended, which changes the odds on the Resurrection before analyzing its evidence. But I see several plausible ways to `privilege' (2). And (3), if adequately defended, shows how this approach can easily favor skeptics.<br /><br />But strictly speaking, (2) is not `objective'. If anything, Christians will be bringing a belief in Christianity to the table when analyzing the textual evidence. And as I mentioned, it is possible that they could legitimize that.<br />""<br /><br />But there are other ways that Christians attempt to ground their beliefs, and those too may have to be addressed. They are Legion. <br /><br />Moving on:<br /><br />"..why a religious believer can safely ignore the challenges posed by the OTF and still call themselves rational."<br /><br />Well, if we're using `rational' in the term of art sense that I use it, this is presumed by the OTF. As I said in the post, we are otherwise presupposing an incoherency argument. How believers can ensure that they are <i>preserving</i> rationality is by sticking with conditionalization. (The new probability is a conditional probability, which itself satisfies the original axioms.) If you mean `rational' in the broader sense of `reasonable', the issue is one of calibrating the Bayes factor.<br /><br />Am I missing anything important?Jesse Parrishhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07811498368484905340noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2475517391193604568.post-27175877719345990522011-08-08T17:33:38.545-07:002011-08-08T17:33:38.545-07:00JP, thanks for the response.
I read your first 5 ...JP, thanks for the response.<br /><br />I read your first 5 paragraphs explaining Bayes calculations (and I am familiar with Bayes theorem, but only in a very dilettantish fashion -- I've read some other primers, built my own spreadsheets, and done some problems to get used to handling a variety of probability problems using the good Reverend's formula). What I am still struggling to understand is why “[t]here are ways to agree on priors, but no accepted manner applies to this case.”<br /><br />You explain that “...if the demographic data is at all problematic for a Christian, he can account for the change in his confidence based on the contrast in the expectations of his view and e.g. a naturalistic view.” I just don’t understand this, nor how it applies to my question.<br /><br />JP: “Right, and from [a Calvinist position], we would argue (in the usual way) against the plausibility of doctrines essential to Calvinism.”<br /><br />Well, my point is that it appears that you are defending the reasonableness of a Calvinist who “knows” that he is saved, precisely because his faith says that he is among the few. I find it hard to call a tautological position reasonable.<br /><br />JP: “I'm a subjective Bayesian, but I'm not endorsing an unprincipled relativism. Rationality and the mere accounting for information is hard freakin' work, much less ensuring that it is all properly calibrated. Bayesianism allows us to turn to believers and list ranges of credence in a variety of positions that they must have in order to be rational, and I doubt they will usually like the results.”<br /><br />It sounds to me like I agree with all of this. It also sounds like it could be a description of the OTF (as I think I understand it). <br /><br />So, and I’m honestly not trying to be daft here, I am just having trouble coming around to understanding what your criticism is, and why a religious believer can safely ignore the challenges posed by the OTF and still call themselves rational.Tony Hoffmanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17445688550795779770noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2475517391193604568.post-34273204814402842122011-08-08T13:56:49.287-07:002011-08-08T13:56:49.287-07:00(And to avoid plagiarizing, the comment about not ...(And to avoid plagiarizing, the comment about not endorsing an unprincipled relativism is due to Tim McGrew. If I recall correctly, it appeared at the bottom of his argument on miracles at the Stanford Encyclopedia, which has since been revised.)Jesse Parrishhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07811498368484905340noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2475517391193604568.post-23910630633022564882011-08-08T13:33:37.778-07:002011-08-08T13:33:37.778-07:00(And I note that Calvinists do not tend to be evid...(And I note that Calvinists do not tend to be evidential apologists, so we may have to discuss the question in an entirely different manner.)Jesse Parrishhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07811498368484905340noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2475517391193604568.post-71152047236694305762011-08-08T13:28:31.648-07:002011-08-08T13:28:31.648-07:00"I am still not clear why the Christian could..."I am still not clear why the Christian could reasonably deny all of the options you listed. Is it your position that the options you listed are all unreasonable, or that there is a better alternative, or simply that since there is no way to agree on priors there is no way to proceed?"<br /><br />There are ways to agree on priors, but no accepted manner applies to this case. Note that a crucial fact here is the <i>assumption</i> that the involved religious person can be rational. What this means is that he already has minimal consistency (logical) and probabilistic consistency (coherency), e.g. if he ascribes p(X), he ascribes p(~X)=1-p(X).<br /><br />So the crucial fact is reasonableness. The main way that we account for reasonableness is by employing Bayes rule to update probabilities in light of new information. This process involves a number, called the `Bayes factor', which is the value by which your old odds are multiplied to get your new odds. The process of calculating this number is called `calibration', and it can be simple and empirical (using e.g. frequency data), or it can capture the broader notions of <i>prediction</i> or <i>explanation</i>. Roughly, the deviation of the Bayes factor from 1 correlates with the degree to which an observation is expected on the assumption of a theory, assuming that the alternative predicts that observation.<br /><br />So if the demographic data is <i>at all problematic</i> for a Christian, he can account for the change in his confidence based on the contrast in the expectations of his view and e.g. a naturalistic view.<br /><br />This form is nice, as it confirms a lot of intuitions. We do not consider every `surprise' to be evidence against our outlook, for example. For that to be the case, there has to be good reason for thinking that we should not have been surprised, especially in the form of an alternative, plausible outlook which explains the observation.<br /><br />Bayes rule can be used to capture an enormous amount of probabilistic reasoning. If you're unfamiliar, I have my (more confusing) primer, and then there's <a href="http://yudkowsky.net/rational/bayes" rel="nofollow">this</a>, which I cite in the same.<br /><br />"I believe I understand that one could take a Calvinist position in response to an OTF query, but this seems like a kind of fideism to me."<br /><br />Right, and from there, we would argue (in the usual way) against the plausibility of doctrines essential to Calvinism. A probabilistic argument using Div and Dep may not settle the case against a particular brand of Christianity, but it may force believers to put confidence in other doctrines which themselves will require defense, or may undermine doctrines they find essential. So if an evangelical circumvents Div and Dep by putting confidence in Predestination, then he must - to be rational - lose confidence in free will.<br /><br />I'm a subjective Bayesian, but I'm not endorsing an unprincipled relativism. Rationality and the mere accounting for information is hard freakin' work, much less ensuring that it is all properly calibrated. Bayesianism allows us to turn to believers and list ranges of credence in a variety of positions that they must have in order to be rational, and I doubt they will usually like the results.<br /><br />But it takes a lot of work to flesh this out. The <i>last</i> thing we should do is avoid this work by making unconvincing demands about having to adopt our positions in the first place.Jesse Parrishhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07811498368484905340noreply@blogger.com